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When Are Fiscal Contractions Successful? 








In the past 25 years, many OECD countries have implemented fiscal contractions to 
strengthen their public finances. The macroeconomic outcomes of these efforts have 
varied. With the aid of an econometric model, this paper seeks to identify the factors 
that make contractions successful from a macroeconomic standpoint. The findings 
suggest, among other things, that favorable changes in the real exchange rate prior 
to the period of fiscal contraction and in the real quantity of money during this period 
play an important part in the macroeconomic outcome. This indicates in turn that it 
may be more difficult to implement successful fiscal contractions within the EMU. The 
findings also show that the composition of the contraction in regard to the relative 
proportions of tax increases and expenditure cutbacks, respectively, is probably less 
important than has usually been assumed. 
 
 
Keywords: Fiscal Contractions; Fiscal Policy; Real Exchange Rate; EMU. 
JEL: C20; E62; E63; H30. 
 
 
¤National Institute of Economic Research (NIER), Box 3116, SE-103 62 Stockholm, Sweden. 
Phone: +46-8-4535926, fax: +46-8-4535980, Email:Goran.Hjelm@konj.se. I thank Henrik 
Hansen for suggesting the econometric approach applied in the paper. I am also grateful to 
Mikael Apel, Henrik Braconier, Per Jansson, Tomas Lindström, Kristian Nilsson, and partici-
pants in NIER seminars for valuable comments. 
 
  2 
1 Introduction 
 
Particularly in the 1970’s, the 1980’s and the first half of the 1990’s, there were sub-
stantial deficits in the public finances of many OECD countries. This meant that the 
gross debt of the general-government sector in relation to GDP soared, even exceed-
ing 100 percent in Belgium, Greece, Ireland and Italy. As the deficits and the increase 
in debt persisted for a long time, the problem was structural rather than cyclical. Since 
this trend was unsustainable, many countries responded with so-called fiscal contrac-
tions in order to reduce the structural deficits.  
This paper analyzes the question why some of these fiscal contractions have 
been more successful than others, in the sense that macroeconomic indicators like 
household consumption and unemployment developed favorably despite the tighter 
fiscal policy.1 A so-called Probit Model is estimated, thus making it possible to calcu-
late the probability of how the macroeconomic outcome will be affected by changes in 
the explanatory variables (listed below). 
The relevance of the question itself is debatable now that all EU countries are 
bound by the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), perhaps limiting the need 
for fiscal contractions in the future. However, recent events have shown that several 
countries (e.g., France, Germany and Italy) have major budget problems and that the 
SGP rules may be relaxed later on. It therefore seems likely that fiscal contractions will 
still be required in the future – both within and outside the EU/EMU. Consequently, 
what history tells us about the causes of their macroeconomic effects may be of inter-
est.  
The findings indicate that aside from the well-known composition effect of the 
fiscal contraction (weight on tax increases and expenditure cuts, respectively), 
changes both in the real exchange rate and in the real quantity of money are of im-
portance for the macroeconomic outcome.2 Membership in the EMU may therefore 
have direct implications for the outcome of a fiscal contraction since a member coun-
try no longer controls its national exchange rate or national monetary policy. The 
explanatory variables analyzed in the paper (including motivation) are the following:3 
                                           
1 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,  
Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the UK and the US are 
included in this study. Period covered: 1970-1997. As we are including exchange rates and 
the money supply, the EMU-period is of less interest when evaluating individual countries. 
2 See also Hjelm (2002a,b) and Lambertini and Tavares (2000). 
3 The size and duration of the fiscal contraction is of minor importance and is excluded in the 
presentation. For an analysis, see the Appendix.   3 
(i)  Prior change in the real effective exchange rate. The two best-known fis-
cal contractions with favorable macroeconomic effects (those in Denmark 
and Ireland) were both preceded by nominal as well as real depreciations, 
and the question is whether this is a general pattern. In Keynesian theory, 
real depreciations cause economic upturns and, hence, strong macroeco-
nomic performance during fiscal contractions may partly be due to prior 
exchange rate movements. Descriptive information regarding exchange 
rate systems applied before and during the periods of fiscal contraction is 
also presented in connection with this question. 
(ii)  The mix of tax increases and expenditure cutbacks in the fiscal contrac-
tion. The significance of the composition of the contraction is the finding 
in the literature that has attracted the greatest attention. The so-called 
‘composition effect’ therefore deserves to be studied together with other 
potentially important variables.  
(iii)  The change in the real quantity of money.4 In theory, an expansionary 
monetary policy may have positive short-run effects on output and em-
ployment. When data on this variable, (together with the exchange rate 
and the mix of measures – see (i) and (ii) above) are also included, infor-
mation is obtained on monetary, fiscal and exchange-rate policies. In the 
regression analysis, we try to sort out their separate effects on the macro-
economic outcome of fiscal contractions.  
 
A brief review of the literature follows in Section 1.1. In Section 2.1, fiscal contraction 
is defined and in Section 2.2 the macroeconomic outcomes of the contractions are 
categorized. Section 2.3 describes the data that were used. The findings of the Probit 
Model are analyzed in Section 3, and the conclusions of the paper are summarized in 
Section 4. 
 
1.1 Previous Studies 
 
The opening shot was fired by Giavazzi’s and Pagano’s (1990) article, where the au-
thors examined two case studies of fiscal contractions – those of Denmark and Ireland 
                                           
4 A possible alternative to the money supply would have been to include the interest rate. The 
real quantity of money could entail problems of endogeneity. A Hausman test shows, however, 
that this is not the case. See section 3.1 and Appendix A3.  4 
in the 1980’s.5 They found that these programmes, contrary to the expectations of 
many politicians and economists with the Keynesian model imprinted in their mindset, 
resulted in substantial macroeconomic improvement in the actual period of fiscal 
contraction. During the contraction in Denmark (Ireland) in 1982-86 (1987-89), the 
structural budget balance strengthened by about 12 (6) percentage points, while total 
GDP growth in the same period exceeded the OECD average by some 4 (4) percentage 
points. 
The theoretical literature in the area has provided a synthesis between the 
Keynesian and neoclassical approaches to the macro-economic effects of fiscal pol-
icy.6 Models have been developed that accommodate both neoclassical and Keynesian 
effects, depending on the initial state of the economy. One example is Sutherland 
(1997), where Keynesian effects of unfinanced tax reductions arise when central-
government debt is initially low, while neoclassical effects arise when central-
government debt is initially high. To simplify somewhat, the explanation is that indi-
viduals find the link between increased central-government indebtedness and future 
tax hikes to be weaker if debt is initially low, and that consequently they see no need 
to set aside funds for future tax payments. Thus, the effect of increased central-
government debt is not countered by reduced household consumption. By contrast, if 
indebtedness is high, individuals will expect taxes to be raised soon and will therefore 
save more.  
The empirical literature has sought to determine whether fiscal contractions lead 
to permanent reduction of the central-government debt ratio, as well as what macro-
economic effects result from these programmes. The latter question is the starting 
point for this paper. One apparently robust finding is that fiscal contractions focused 
on reducing expenditure rather than raising taxes will more likely result in a favorable 
macroeconomic tendency (see, for example, Alesina and Ardagna, 1998, Alesina and 
Perotti, 1996, and Zaghini, 2001). In this paper, this composition effect is confronted 
with changes in the real exchange rate and in the real quantity of money before and 
during the period of fiscal contraction (see also Hjelm, 2002a,b). 
                                           
5 See Fels and Froelish (1987) and Hellwig and Neumann (1987) for earlier 
contributions.  
6 See Blanchard (1990), Bertola and Drazen (1993), Perotti (1999) and Sutherland (1997) for 
theoretical models representing this synthesis. The “Keynesian approach” means that an ex-
pansionary fiscal policy has positive ripple effects that increase economic activity. The 
“neoclassical approach”, to simplify somewhat, means that a policy of fiscal expansion is 
counteracted by a reduction of individual consumption in anticipation of higher taxes in the 
future. Thus, the overall effect on the economy needs not be positive.  5 
2 Macroeconomic Outcomes of Fiscal Contractions 
 
The primary purpose of this paper is to determine the degree to which the probability 
of a favorable and an unfavorable macroeconomic outcome, respectively, depend on 
the factors mentioned in the Introduction above. For this purpose, the method used 
consists of the following steps: 
 
(i)  Definition of fiscal contraction (Section 2.1). 
(ii)  Definitions of favorable and unfavorable outcomes (Section 2.2).  
(iii)  A look at data subsequently used in the Probit Model. More specifically, the 
relationship between macro-outcome (Point (ii)) and the variables listed 
above in the Introduction (see also Section 2.3) 
(iv)  Estimating the Probit Model and calculating the variation in the probability of 
different macro-outcomes according to the explanatory variables (Section 3). 
 
2.1 Definition of Fiscal Contraction 
 
A fiscal contraction entails political decisions to increase taxes and/or reduce expen-
diture. However, since public finances are also affected by other factors, the budget 
balance as such does not only reflect the fiscal-policy measures actually taken. Con-
sequently, one should focus on the primary balance (that is, the balance excluding 
costs of interest) adjusted for cyclical effects, which is customarily termed the primary 
structural budget balance. The OECD calculations of this balance are used (see Giorno 
et al., 1995), and fiscal contraction is defined in accordance with Giavazzi and   
Pagano (1996): 
A period of time is called a fiscal contraction period if the cyclically adjusted pri-
mary budget deficit (in proportion to potential GDP) falls by:  
(i)  five percent in four consecutive years, 
(ii)  four percent in three consecutive years, 
(iii)     three percent in two consecutive years, or 
(iv)  three percent in one year. 
 
The fiscal contractions so defined that were implemented in the OECD area during the  6 
period 1970-97 are shown in Table 1.7 Included are the well-known contractions in 
Denmark and Ireland, as well as two periods of fiscal contraction in Sweden. 
 
Table 1: Fiscal Contractions in the OECD, 1970–97 
 
Country Period  Country Period 
Australia 86-88  Italy  76-77 
Belgium 82-87  Italy  82-83 
Belgium 93-94  Italy  91-93 
Canada 93-97  Italy  95-97 
Denmark 83-87  Netherlands  91-93 
Finland 75-76  Portugal  82-87 
Germany 82-83  Spain  96-97 
Greece 82-83  Sweden  84-87 
Greece 86-87  Sweden  94-97 
Greece 90-97  UK  79-82 
Ireland 81-84  UK  94-97 
Ireland 86-89     
Note: See footnote 1 for countries included in the OECD and Section 2.1 for definition of fiscal contrac-
tion. 
Source: OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles 1998. 
 
2.2 Macroeconomic Outcomes 
 
Fiscal contractions are characterized below according to macroeconomic outcome. To 
obtain a relatively broad picture of the outcome, four variables are used: growth in 
consumption, investment, net exports8, and change in unemployment. A natural 
starting point for categorization is to compare the data with the OECD averages for 
these variables during the respective period of fiscal contraction. If a country per-
forms better than the OECD average during a contraction, it is an indication of a good 
outcome. Since the business cycles of individual countries and the OECD are not per-
fectly correlated, cyclical factors would play a role in some cases. Consequently, there 
is also a comparison with the country’s own averages for these variables during peri-
                                           
7 Note that the actual fiscal contraction periods can exceed four years, see Table 1. For exam-
ple, a country may fulfill the four year criteria in the definition above and, in the year after that 
period, the contraction may continue for one year and fulfill the one year criteria.  
8 Defined here as growth in exports minus growth in imports.  7 
ods without fiscal contraction.9 Although the comparison with the OECD average is 
most important in the decision rule set forth below, a reasonable balance should be 
struck between the two measures of comparison. The following categorization is ap-
plied: 
(i)  If a period of fiscal contraction brings (a) outcomes as good as, or better than, 
the OECD’s and/or the country’s own mean for three of the four variables as 
well as (b) an outcome as good as, or better than, the OECD’s for two of the 
four variables, the macroeconomic outcome is considered a “+”. 
(ii) If a period of fiscal contraction brings (a) outcomes as good as, or better than, 
the OECD’s and/or the country’s own mean for two of the four variables as well 
as (b) an outcome as good as, or better than, the OECD’s for one of the four 
variables, the macroeconomic outcome is considered a “0”. 
(iii) The remaining fiscal-contraction periods have the least favorable macroeco-
nomic outcomes and are categorized as “-“. 
 
Of course, a categorization like this one does not provide an optimal picture of the 
macroeconomic outcome. It is necessary, however, for the econometric analysis, and 
it should provide a rough estimate of the macroeconomic tendency.10 Table 2 shows 
which fiscal contractions are included in the three categories. An “X” in Table 2 means 
that the mean value of the contraction is equal to, or better than, the OECD’s (the ”(1)” 
columns) and the country’s own mean (the ”(2)” columns).11  
It may be noted that, as expected, the known cases of successful fiscal con-
tractions in Ireland and Denmark are included in the “+” category together with the 





                                           
9 For example, the variables for Spain’s of fiscal contraction in 1996-97 are compared with the 
mean values for the period 1970-95 when there was no fiscal contraction. 
10 Estimates of Probit Models and similar definitions of outcome are frequently found in this 
literature. See, for example, Alesina and Ardagna (1998), Alesina and Perotti (1996) and 
Zaghini (2001). 
11 For changes in unemployment, it is not fruitful to compare with the country’s own mean. A 
”X” in column 2 means, instead, that unemployment decreased during the period of contrac-
tion.   8 
Table 2: Macroeconomic Outcomes During Periods of Fiscal Contraction 
Contraction and 
category 
Cons. Invest.  Net  exports Unempl. 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
”+”          
Belgium  82-87     X   X  X  X   
Canada  93-97  X  X  X  X  X  X 
Denmark  83-87    X X X X    X X 
Ireland  86-89  X    X X X     X 
Italy  76-77  X X X X X X     
Netherlands  91-93  X      X  X  X  
Spain  96-97        X X X X X 
Sweden  84-87   X  X  X    X  X 
Sweden  94-97    X X X X X   X 
UK  94-97  X X X X X X X X 
          
“0”          
Australia  86-88         X  X  X 
Germany  82-83     X  X  X    
Greece  86-87         X  X  X 
Italy  82-83          X X X   
Italy  91-93          X X X   
Portugal  82-87          X X X X 
          
”-”          
Belgium  93-94         X  X    
Finland  75-76     X       
Greece  82-83          
Greece  90-97     X       
Ireland  81-84         X  X    
Italy  95-97       X        
UK    79-82          
Note: ”Cons.”= growth in household consumption, ”Invest.”= growth in investment (not owner-occupied 
homes), “Net exports” = growth in exports less growth in imports, ”Unempl.” = change in unemployment 
rate. The (1)-columns compare with the OECD mean during the contraction period. The (2)-columns 
compare with the mean during noncontractionary periods for the respective country. “X” means that the 
outcome of the contraction is as good as, or better than, the respective mean values for the OECD and 
for the same country. “X” in column (2) for unemployment means that unemployment decreased during 
the contraction.  
Sources: OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles 1998 and OECD Economic Outlook, various issues. 
  9 
2.3 Data 
The central question now, of course, is why some fiscal contractions show better out-
comes than others. Are there any patterns that can help us both to understand the 
outcomes and to provide recipes for successful economic policy-making in the future? 
Table 3 lists the contractions in each group (”+”, ”0”, and ”–”, respectively) together 
with data before (“B”) and during (“D”) the periods of fiscal contraction used in the 
econometric analysis. The following observations may be noted: 
 
(i)  There is a substantial difference between the three groups in regard to 
changes in real effective exchange rates (REER) before the fiscal contraction 
began.12 In the group with the best macroeconomic outcomes (”+”), all fis-
cal contractions were preceded by real depreciation averaging –10.3 
percent. The corresponding data for the two other categories are -1.1 per-
cent (”0”, i.e. depreciation) and 2.9 percent (”–”, i.e. appreciation). 
 
(ii)  Contractions with more favorable outcome have higher growth in the real 
quantity of money, M2, during the contractions while there is no clear pat-
tern for growth in M2 before the contractions started.  
 
(iii)  The column ”(REV+EXP)” measures the relative importance of an increase in 
structural tax revenue (”REV”) and a decrease in structural expenditure 
(”EXP”) as a percentage of potential GDP (that is, the composition of the 
contraction). If ”(REV+EXP)” is positive (negative), the contraction consists 
mainly of an increase (decrease) in structural tax revenue (expenditure). 
Here the categories differ. The better the macroeconomic outcome, the 
more the contraction has consisted primarily of expenditure cutbacks, a 





                                           
12 Refers to the total percentage change in the two years immediately preceding each fiscal 
contraction. For example, the change in REER prior to Sweden’s fiscal contraction in 1984-87 
is measured by comparing the value for REER in 1983 with the value for 1981. During (“D”) the 
contraction period, the average percentage change per year is used to avoid dependence on 
the duration of the period.   10 
Table 3: Macroeconomic Conditions for Fiscal Contractions  
Contraction and  REER  M2  (REV+EXP) Exchange-rate system 
category  B D B  D    B  D 
”+”             
Belgium 82-87  -13.9  -3.0  0.5  4.1  -6.0  F(ERM) ↓  F(ERM)  ↓  
Canada 93-97  -1.8  -1.9  5.8  4.1  -6.0  FL  FL 
Denmark 83-87  -8.9  3.8  1.7  9.3  3.5  F(ERM)↓   F(ERM) 
Ireland 86-89  -6.0  -3.8  0.9  8.3  -10.0  F(ERM)  F(ERM) ↓  
Italy 76-77  -14.0  -5.6  4.4  2.6  1.0  FL  FL 
Netherlands 91-93  -5.6  0.3  14.2  1.1  2.1  F(ERM)  F(ERM) ↑  
Spain  96-97  -7.8  0.9 4.9 -5.5  -0.4  F(ERM)  F(ERM) 
Sweden 84-87  -18.4  0.7  -9.3  1.6  -0.4  F(Basket) ↓ F(Basket) 
Sweden 94-97  -18.1  2.8  -1.0  0.4  -3.6  F(Basket)/FL FL 
UK 94-97  -8.2  4.3  4.0  5.2  -1.2  F(ERM)/FL  FL 
Mean -10,3  -0,2  2,6  3,1  -2,1    
”0”             
Australia 86-88  -13.2  -1.1  17.2  3.5  -3.3  FL  FL 
Germany 82-83  -8.2  3.4  -4.0  0.3  -3.0  F(ERM)  F(ERM)↑  
Greece 86-87  2.7  -9.9  11.8  -1.0  -2.0  MFL↓  MFL↑  
Italy 82-83  -2.4  2.0  -14.7 0.7  3.0  F(ERM) ↓   F(ERM) 
Italy 91-93  6.9  -5.5  9.0  2.6  3.3  F(ERM)  F(ERM)/FL 
Portugal 82-87  7.4  -1.2  18.8  0.2  -2.4  F(Basket) ↓ F(Basket) ↓  
Mean -1,1  -2,1  6,4  1,1  -0,7    
”-”             
Belgium 93-94  0.5  0.1  6.3  0.4  0.4  F(ERM) ↑   F(ERM) 
Finland 75-76  1.1  0.6  -2.4  0.3  16.0  F($)  F($) 
Greece 82-83  7.2  5.2  8.4  4.7  4.2  MFL↓  MFL↓  
Greece  90-97  15.7 1.8 14.4 -2.6  3.2  MFL↓  MFL↓ /ERM 
Ireland 81-84  -1.0  -4.2  4.0  -4.4  2.8  F(ERM)  F(ERM) ↓  
Italy  95-97  -21.3 3.4  -2.1 -10.5 -0.9  FL  FL/F(ERM) 
UK  79-82  17.8  10.1  -0.9  3.9  5.6  FL  FL 
Mean  2,9 2,4 4,0 -1,2  4,5    
Note:: ”REER” (”M2”) = percentage change in real effective exchange rate (real quantity of money per cap-
ita, M2). M3 is used for Belgium for the contraction in 93-94. ”B” = two years before the fiscal 
contraction (a negative figure means depreciation). REER for Finland in 75-76 and Italy in 76-77 is based 
on the nominal effective exchange rate because of data availability. ”D” = during the period of fiscal con-
traction. ”(REV+EXP)” = change in cyclically adjusted general-government revenue and expenditure in 
proportion to potential GDP. A positive (negative) figure means that tax increases (expenditure cutbacks) 
predominated. ”F”(FL) = fixed (floating) exchange rate. ”MFL” = managed float.  () ↓↑ = devaluation (re-
valuation) beyond the norm with a fixed rate, see footnote 13. ‘Basket’=basket of currencies.  
Source: IFS 2001, OECD Fiscal Positions and Business Cycles 1998 and Annual Report on Exchange Rate 
Restrictions, IMF, annual issues for 1973-1998. 
  11 
”Exchange-rate system” provides supplementary information on the changes in real 
exchange rates shown in the first two columns. For example, ”F(ERM)↓ ” in column ”D” 
for Ireland in 1986-89 means that Ireland had a fixed exchange rate (”F”) within the 
ERM during (”D”) the contraction period and depreciated (”↓ ”) beyond the permitted 
variation of ± 2.25 percent.13 ”Exchange-rate systems” are to some extent an unde-
fined concept, and there is a rough scale from fully floating (”FL”) to “managed float” 
(”MFL”) to fixed (“F”) rates. It is clear, however, that in the group with the best out-
comes (“+”) only one country (Netherlands) revalued its’ fixed rate. Other countries  
within this group have either had floating rates both before and during contraction 
(Canada and Italy), had a fixed exchange rate and then devalued/depreciated (Swe-
den’s two contractions and the UK) or devalued within the ERM (Belgium, Denmark, 
Ireland and Spain14). For categories ”0” and ”–”, by contrast, there are no clear pat-
terns.  
In summary, the data in Table 3 suggests at least two sources of why some fiscal 
contractions generate favorable macroeconomic outcomes: (i) a depreciated/devalued 
currency prior the contraction; (ii) more weight on expenditure cuts compared to tax 
increases. The data in Table 3 also indicates, however, that these two factors coincide 
and the econometric analysis below will confirm this indication to some extent. 
 
3 Econometric Analysis 
 
Probit Models are frequently found in the literature on this subject.15 Alesina and Ard-
agna (1998), for example, estimate a Probit Model where the probability of a certain 
macro outcome is determined by the size (not significant) and composition (signifi-
cant) of the fiscal contraction. The so-called composition effect is confronted below 
with changes in the real exchange rate prior to the start of the contraction and with 
                                           
13 ‘Fixed’ is hence not an entirely satisfactory term as the currencies within the ERM were al-
lowed to vary ± 2.25 percent. Italy’s exchange rate was allowed to vary by ± 6 percent. 
Beginning in August 1993, all ERM currencies were allowed to vary by ± 15 percent. 
14 Spain depreciated its currency by about 8 percent within the ERM between 1993 and 1994. 
Since the ERM interval was then +/- 15 percent, Spain’s depreciation is not considered to have 
exceeded the permitted range of variation within the ERM. In reality, however, this means of 
course that Spain’s depreciation reinforces the pattern for the countries in category “+”.  
15 See Long (Ch. 5, 1997) for an extensive textbook description of the model, and Appendix 
A.1 for a short technical description of the model.  12 
real growth in the quantity of money during the contraction period.16 By estimating 
both simple and multiple regressions, an indication was obtained of the covariation, if 
any, among the three variables. Assume the following general relationship: 
 
* ' yx β ε =+       (1) 
 
where 
* y  is a so-called latent nonobservable dependent variable. In our case, it 
represents the “macroeconomic outcome of fiscal contractions” and is reflected in the 
observable variable  y , where  y  = 0 for contractions with the worst macroeconomic 
outcome, (”–”), y  = 2 for the best outcomes  (”+”) and  y  = 1 for the other outcomes 
(”0”). Furthermore,  x  in Equation 1 represents the independent variables. The Probit 
analysis consists of two steps. First, simple and multiple regressions are estimated; 
these provide only information about the direction taken by the probability (toward 
better or worse outcomes) when there is a change in the respective independent vari-
able. Then so-called predicted probabilities are calculated; these tell us how the 
probability of a certain macro outcome (”+”, ”0” or ”–”, respectively) varies with the 
size of the explanatory variables. 
 
3.1 Results of the Regressions 
 
The simple regressions in Table 4 (columns (1)-(3)) provide an indication of the direc-
tion in which the three variables affect the probability of better macroeconomic 
outcomes. The definition of  y  above means that the higher  y  is, the better the out-
come. A real appreciation, where ∆REER(B) increases before (”B”) the contraction 
period, means a higher probability of a less favorable macroeconomic outcome (see 
regression (1)). Higher growth in the real quantity of money during (”D”), the actual 
contraction period, means a higher probability of a better outcome (see regression 
(2)).17 Finally, a larger proportion of tax increases means a higher probability of a less 
favorable macroeconomic outcome (i.e. (REV+EXP) increases; see regression (3)). In 
short, successful contractions are associated by preceding depreciations, expansion-
ary monetary policy, and the use of spending cuts (instead of increases in taxes).  
                                           
16 The real exchange rate during the contraction period, the real growth in the quantity of 
money prior to the contraction period and the duration and size of the contraction were also 
studied. However, no significant effects were found for these variables. See Appendix A2. 
17 See footnote 2 and the Appendix concerning test for endogeneity of the money supply.  13 
Regressions (4)-(7) show the results for all combinations of these three vari-
ables. In these multiple regressions, it can be seen that the significance of some 
parameters decreases, whereas pseudo-R2 (which is generally low in these models) 
increases. This suggests some degree of covariation among the variables; in other 
words, their separate effects are obscured by problems of multicollinearity. The signs 
of the coefficients, however, are the same as in the simple regressions, and the coef-
ficients are also of approximately the same magnitude.  
Both the real exchange rate variable and the money supply variable keep their 
significance (at least at the 10 percent level) in the multiple regressions. It is worth 
noting in regression (7) when all three explanatory variables are included, the ‘com-
position effect’ (REV+EXP) is not significant and the magnitude is smaller compared to 
the more parsimonious regressions. Hence, the heralded ‘composition effect’ seems 
not to be an important determinant of successful fiscal contractions. Previous studies, 
not taking exchange rate and monetary policy fully into account, have probably over-
estimated the effect of composition. 
 
Table 4: Ordered Probit Regressions 
Variables  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5)  (6)  (7) 
∆REER(B) -0.074*     -0.101* -0.054**   -0.080* 
 (0.025)     (0.046) (0.032)    (0.035) 
∆M2(D)   0.148*    0.205*   0.159* 0.196* 
   (0.066)    (0.072)   (0.072) (0.077) 
(REV+EXP)     -0.195**   -0.138  -0.228 -0.135 
      (0.116)  (0.128)  (0.141) (0.090) 
Pseudo R2  0.16  0.10 0.18 0.34 0.25  0.29  0.40 
Note: For the dependent variable ”Macroeconomic outcome”, see Section 2.2. Standard error in 
parentheses. ”*”,”**” shows significance at 5- and 10-percent level, respectively. Estimates are 
made in Eviews 4 with robust covariance matrices (GLM) and BHHH algorithms. 
 
3.2 Predicted Probabilities 
 
Here the variation is calculated for the three macroeconomic outcomes according to 
the size of the independent variables, in view of regression (7) in Table 4.18 One inde-
pendent variable at a time is analyzed, with each of the others set at its mean. The 
uppermost graph in Figure 1 shows how the probabilities of macro outcomes  ”+”, ”0” 
and ”–” vary with change in the real exchange rate before the fiscal contractions. The  
                                           
18 Predicted probabilities have also been calculated from the simple regressions, with similar 
results.  14 
Figure 1: Predicted Probabilities Calculated from Regression 7; see Table 4. ”+” out-
comes, solid lines; ”0” outcomes, short-dashed lines; ”–” outcomes, long-dashed 
lines. 
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results show, for example, that the probability of the best macro outcome (”+”, solid 
line) is about 80 percent when the contraction is preceded by a real depreciation of 20 
percent (i. e. –20 percent on the x-axis). The probability of the worst macro outcome 
(”–”, long dashed lines) is roughly 50 percent when the contraction is preceded by a 
real appreciation of 5 percent. 
The middle graph in Figure 1 shows how the macroeconomic outcomes vary with 
the average growth of the real quantity of money during the periods of fiscal contrac-
tion. With an average decrease of 5 percent in the real quantity of money, the proba-  15 
bility of the worst macro outcome is roughly 60 percent. Further, real growth in M2 of 
5-10 percent per year means that the probability of the best macro outcome is be-
tween 60 and 80 percent.19 
The importance of the composition of the contraction, or the mix of fiscal-policy 
components, is measured by the variable (REV+EXP), which is the sum of the changes 
in structural revenue and expenditure in percent of potential GDP during the period of 
fiscal contraction. The lowest graph in Figure 1 shows that the probability of the best 
macroeconomic outcome exceeds 60 percent when the reduction in expenditure is 5 
percent larger than the strengthening of revenue – i. e. when (REV+EXP) = -5. In addi-
tion, the probability of the worst macro outcome is some 60 percent when (REV +EXP) 




It is obvious that fiscal contractions have generated widely differing macroeconomic 
outcomes for the OECD countries in the last 25 years. One important question, there-
fore, is whether there are any circumstances that statistically distinguish contractions 
with favorable macroeconomic effects. A seemingly robust finding in the literature, 
and one that is also corroborated to some extent in this paper, is that contractions 
focused on reducing expenditure rather than raising taxes are more likely to produce 
a good macroeconomic outcome. It should be noted, however, that the significance of 
this composition effect disappeared in the multiple regression when controlling for 
preceding changes in the real exchange rate and changes in the money supply during 
the contractions. Thus, the composition effect has probably been overestimated in 
previous studies that did not consider these two additional variables. 
 The findings show further that depreciation in the real exchange rate before a 
contraction begins has positive macroeconomic effects, lending support to previous 
findings by Hjelm (2002a,b) and Lambertini and Tavares (2000). The explanation is 
simple. The initial enhancement of competitive strength gives the economy an expan-
sionary push. The fiscal contraction then helps to dampen inflationary and wage 
                                           
19 This variable is endogenous (not directly subject to influence by politicians/central banks) 
with a fixed exchange rate and free capital movements – the actual situation of many countries 
in the study. More specifically, the nominal quantity of money with a fixed exchange rate is 
largely demand-determined, whereas with a flexible exchange rate it largely supply-
determined. Thus, only in the latter case can politicians/central banks directly affect the quan-
tity of money.  16 
pressure that could erode competitiveness, with a positive effect on the economy. It is 
difficult to imagine, for example, that Sweden’s two periods of fiscal contraction 
(1984–87 and 1994–97) would have had such favorable macroeconomic outcomes 
without the substantial real depreciations that occurred in 1982 and 1992. Data on 
the system of exchange rates before and during the contractions show that the group 
with the best macroeconomic outcomes is distinguished by the fact that all countries 
in it (except the Netherlands) either had floating exchange rates or had devalued their 
fixed rates. Finally, growth in the real quantity of money also appears to increase the 
probability of a favorable macroeconomic tendency during the contraction period, 
confirming standard results of positive short-run effects of monetary policy.  
The apparent significance of changes in the real exchange rate, as well as 
changes in the real quantity of money, for the macroeconomic outcome of fiscal con-
tractions has certain implications for a country considering membership in the EMU. 
Since the new member would lose its power over the nominal exchange rate, it would 
have to accomplish changes in the real exchange rate (and thus in competitiveness) 
by adjusting prices and wages. However, since prices and wages are slow to change, 
this process takes a long time. Moreover, the country’s power over monetary policy, 
and thus over the quantity of money, would also be removed. Taken together, these 
factors mean that within the EMU it would be harder to use fiscal contractions to 
achieve favorable macroeconomic ends. The first conclusion, therefore, is that a 
country that has joined, or is planning to join, the EMU has an additional reason to 
maintain sound general-government finances. The second conclusion is that EMU-
countries who need to carry out fiscal contractions in the near future (France, Ger-
many and Italy, for example) is less likely to achieve a favorable macroeconomic 
outcome during the contractions due to the lack of country-specific exchange rate 
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Appendix 
 
A.1 Technical Information About the Model 
 
Assume that the following general relationships apply: 
 
* ' yx β ε =+ ,        (2) 
 
where 
* y  is a so-called latent nonobservable dependent variable. In our case it repre-
sents the ”macroeconomic outcome of fiscal contractions”. This variable, 
* y , 
is reflected in the observable variable  y , where: 
 
                                                   y  = 0 if 
* '' y ≤−, 
    = 1 if ”0” < 
* '' y <+, 
    = 2 if “+”
*. y ≤      (3) 
 
In other words,  y  = 0 for contractions with the worst macroeconomic outcomes,  y  = 
2 for the best outcomes and  y  = 1 for other outcomes. Further,  x  in Equation (1) 
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where  Φ  is the cumulative normal distribution while  012 ,, µµµ , and β  are   




Here calculations are made of the variation in the three macroeconomic outcomes ac-
cording to the size of the independent variables. One independent variable at a time 
is analyzed, with the others set at their means. The probability of outcome m is as 
follows:  
  20 
l l l l l
1 ** * Pr( , ) ( ' ) ( ' ), mm ym x x x µβ µ β − == Φ −− Φ −   m = 0, 1, 2.  (4) 
 
 
A.2 Test of Several Variables 
 
Section 3.1 showed the regression results for variables that appear to have a certain 
significant effect on macroeconomic outcomes. Shown below are regression results 
for the following variables that proved not to have significant effects: 
•  Change in the real exchange rate during the contraction period (∆REER(D)). 
•  Change in the real quantity of money before to the contraction period 
(∆M2(B)). 
•  Size of the contraction. Refers here to the total change in the structural balance 
in proportion to potential GDP. 
•  Duration (in years) of the contraction. 
 
Table 5: Ordered Probit Regressions 
 
Variables      
∆REV  XL(D)  -0.059    
  (0.064)    
∆M2(B)   -0.012    
   (0.041)    
Size     0.043   
     (0.069)  
Duration     0.079 
       (0.129)
Pseudo R2  0.02 0.00 0.01 0.01 
      
Note: For the dependent variable ”Macroeconomic outcome,” see Section 2.2. Standard error in 
parentheses.  The estimates were made in Eviews 4 with robust covariance matrices (GLM) and 
the BHHH algorithm. 
 
Table 5 shows only simple regressions. All of the variables above, however, were in-
cluded in multiple regressions with the variables that proved to have a significant 
effect (see Table 4). None of the variables above showed any significance, while the 
variables in Table 4 did not lose significance. 
  21 
A.3 Hausman Test 
 
Shown below is a Hausman test for possible endogeneity between growth in the real 
quantity of money and macroeconomic outcome (see Hausman, 1978, and Davidson & 
MacKinnon ,1989, 1993). The test is based on regression (7) in Table 4 and consists 
of two steps. First, a regression is estimated with growth in the real quantity of money 
during the contraction periods as the dependent variable, the other independent vari-
ables in regression (7) in Table 4, and an instrument. The instrument is to be chosen 
so that it is correlated with the real quantity of money but not with the macroeco-
nomic outcome (that is, the dependent variable in regression (7)). Here the system of 
exchange rates is used as the instrument, (VX_SYS), and is coded as a binary variable 
that assumes the value of 1 (0) if the country had a floating (fixed) exchange rate dur-
ing the contraction period.20 The result is shown in Table 6, and VX_SYS are 




Table 6: Hausman Test, Step 1 
 
Variables 
∆REV XL(D)  0.020 
 (0.117) 
(REV+EXP)   -0.134 
 (0.150) 
VX_SYS   2.366* 
 (0.590) 
R2   0.06 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Growth in Real Quantity of Money, M2. Standard error in pa-
rentheses. ”*” shows significance at the 5 percent level. This linear equation was generated in 
Eviews 4 with a Newey-West adjusted covariance matrix. 
 
                                           
20 As can be seen in Table 3, any categorization of exchange-rate systems is somewhat un-
clear since certain countries changed systems during the contraction period. The following 
contractions are coded with 1, and the countries concerned are therefore considered to have 
had floating exchange rates during the contraction period: Canada, Italy 76-77, Sweden 94-
97, UK 94-97, Greece 86-87, Italy 91-93, Australia 86-88, Greece 82-83, Greece 90-97, UK 
79-82.  22 
 
Step 2 in the Hausman test is again to estimate regression (7) in Table 4, this time 
with the residuals (RES) from Step 1 as an independent variable. If RES is significant in 
this regression, the null hypothesis of exogeneity is rejected – i.e., there is then prob-
lems of endogeneity. The result is shown in Table 7, and the coefficient for RES is not 
significant; therefore, exogeneity cannot be rejected. 
 
Table 7: Hausman Test, Step 2 
 
Variables 
∆REV XL(D)  -0.075 
 (0.062) 
∆M2(B)   0.067 
 (0.312) 
(REV+EXP)   -0.164 
 (0.179) 
RES   0.148 
 (0.388) 
Pseudo R2         0.41 
 
Note: The dependent variable is Macroeconomic Outcome. Standard error in parentheses. The 
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